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On the Throughput of Secure Hybrid-ARQ Protocols
for Gaussian Block-Fading Channels
Xiaojun Tang, Ruoheng Liu, Predrag Spasojevic´, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract
The focus of this paper is an information-theoretic study of retransmission protocols for reliable
packet communication under a secrecy constraint. The hybrid automatic retransmission request (HARQ)
protocol is revisited for a block-fading wire-tap channel, in which two legitimate users communicate over
a block-fading channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper who intercepts the transmissions through
an independent block-fading channel. In this model, the transmitter obtains a 1-bit ACK/NACK feedback
from the legitimate receiver via an error-free public channel. Both reliability and confidentiality of secure
HARQ protocols are studied by the joint consideration of channel coding, secrecy coding, and retrans-
mission protocols. In particular, the error and secrecy performance of repetition time diversity (RTD) and
incremental redundancy (INR) protocols are investigated based on good Wyner code sequences, which
ensure that the confidential message is decoded successfully by the legitimate receiver and is kept in
total ignorance by the eavesdropper for a given set of channel realizations. This paper first illustrates
that there exists a good rate-compatible Wyner code family which ensures a secure INR protocol. Next,
two types of outage probabilities, connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities are defined in
order to characterize the tradeoff between the reliability of the legitimate communication link and the
confidentiality with respect to the eavesdropper’s link. For a given connection/secrecy outage probability
pair, an achievable throughput of secure HARQ protocols is derived for block-fading channels. Finally,
both asymptotic analysis and numerical computations demonstrate the benefits of HARQ protocols to
throughput and secrecy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable communication is essential in applications of wireless packet-oriented data networks. A class
of special coding schemes, the so-called hybrid automatic retransmission request (HARQ), combine
powerful channel coding with retransmission protocols to enhance the reliability of communication links.
Among currently available HARQ protocols, the most elementary form is the repetition-coding-based
HARQ which combines several noisy observations of the same packet by using a suitable diversity
technique at the receiver, such as maximal-ratio combining, equal-gain combining, or selection combining.
A more powerful HARQ scheme is the so-called incremental redundancy HARQ, which achieves higher
throughput efficiency by adapting its error correcting code redundancy to fluctuating channel conditions.
In an incremental redundancy scheme, the message is encoded at the transmitter by a “mother” code.
Initially, only a selected number of coded symbols are transmitted. The selected number of coded symbols
form a codeword of a punctured mother code. If a retransmission is requested, additional redundancy
symbols are sent under possibly different channel conditions. An information-theoretic analysis of the
throughput performance of HARQ protocols over block-fading Gaussian collision channels is found in
[1]. By assuming Gaussian random coding and typical-set decoding, the results of [1] are independent of
the particular coding/decoding technique and can be regarded as providing a limiting performance in the
information-theoretic sense. Another line of recent research on HARQ concerned with various mother
codes and their puncturing can be found in [2]–[8].
Confidentiality is a basic requirement for secure communication over wireless networks. We note that
the broadcast nature of the wireless medium gives rise to a number of security issues. In particular, wireless
transmission is very susceptible to eavesdropping since anyone within communication range can listen
to the traffic and possibly extract information. Traditionally, confidentiality has been provided by using
cryptographic methods, which rely heavily on secret keys. However, the distribution and maintenance of
secret keys are still open issues for large wireless networks. Fortunately, confidential communication is
possible without sharing a secret key between legitimate users. This was shown by Wyner in his seminal
paper [9]. In the discrete memoryless wire-tap channel model he proposed, the communication between
two legitimate users is eavesdropped upon via a degraded channel (the eavesdropper channel). The level
3of ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential message is measured by the equivocation
rate. Perfect secrecy requires that the equivocation rate should be asymptotically equal to the message
entropy rate. Wyner showed that perfect secrecy can be achieved via a stochastic code, referred to as
Wyner secrecy code. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized this result and determined the secrecy capacity
region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages in [10]. Recent research investigates multi-
user communication with confidential messages, e.g., multiple access channels with confidential messages
[11], [12], multiple access wire-tap channels [13], and interference channels with confidential messages
[14]. The effect of fading on secure communication has been studied in [15]–[18]. More specifically,
assuming that all communicating parties have perfect channel state information (CSI) prior to the message
transmission, [15] has studied the delay limited secrecy capacity of wireless channels, while [16]–[18]
have studied the secrecy capacity of an ergodic fading channel. [18] has also considered the ergodic
scenario in which the transmitter has no CSI about the eavesdropper channel.
In this paper, we investigate secure packet communication based on HARQ protocols. The challenge
of this problem is twofold: first, the encoder at the transmitter needs to provide sufficient redundancy for
the legitimate receiver to decode its message successfully; on the other hand, too much redundancy may
help adversarial eavesdropping. As an example, retransmission is an effective way to enhance reliability,
but nevertheless it may also compromise confidentiality. This motivates the joint consideration of channel
coding, secrecy coding, and retransmission protocols.
We consider a frequency-flat block-fading Gaussian wire-tap channel. In this model, a transmitter sends
confidential messages to a legitimate receiver via a block-fading channel in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper who intercepts the transmission through an independent block-fading channel. We assume
that the transmitter has no perfect CSI, but receives a 1-bit ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate
receiver via a reliable public channel. Under this setting, we study the secure HARQ protocols from an
information theoretic point of view. In particular, the error and secrecy performance of repetition time
diversity (RTD) and incremental redundancy (INR) protocols are investigated based on good Wyner code
sequences, which ensure that the confidential message is decoded successfully by the legitimate receiver
and is kept completely secret from the eavesdropper for a given set of channel realizations of both the
main and the eavesdropper channels. Next, we show that there exists a good rate-compatible Wyner
code family which suits the secure INR protocol. Due to the absence of CSI, the transmitter cannot
adapt its code and power level to channel conditions. Instead, for a given mother code, we consider the
outage performance of secure HARQ protocols. Specifically, we define two types of outage: connection
outage and secrecy outage. The outage probabilities (i.e., the probabilities of connection and secrecy
4outage) are used to characterize the tradeoff between the reliability of the legitimate communication link
and the confidentiality with respect to the eavesdropper’s link. We evaluate the achievable throughput of
HARQ protocols under the constraints on these two outage probabilities. Finally, we compare the secrecy
throughput of two HARQ protocols through both numerical computations and an asymptotic analysis,
and illustrate the benefit of HARQ schemes to information secrecy.
Generally speaking, when the coding parameters (main channel code rate and secrecy information rate
for ensuring reliability and secrecy, respectively) can be freely chosen, INR can achieve a significantly
larger throughput than RTD, which concurs with the results not involving secrecy where it has been
shown that mutual-information accumulation (INR) is a more effective approach than SNR-accumulation
(RTD) [1]. However, when one is forced to ensure small connection outage for the main channel even
when it is bad, one is forced to reduce the main channel code rate. The INR scheme, having a larger
coding gain (to both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper), needs to sacrifice a larger portion of
the main channel code rate in order to satisfy the secrecy requirement. Hence, when the main channel
code rate is bounded due to the connection outage constraint, the achievable secrecy throughput of INR
may be smaller than that of RTD. This result deviates from that not involving secrecy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the system model and preliminaries in
Section II. In Section III, we prove the existence of good Wyner codes for parallel channel communication
and define outage events, while these results are applied to INR and RTD protocols in Section IV. We
derive the secrecy throughput of two protocols over block fading channels in Section V, and present an
asymptotic analysis in Section VI. We illustrate and compare the various results and protocols numerically
in Section VII. Finally, we give conclusions and some interesting directions for future research in
Section VIII, The proofs of the results are provided in appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a model in which a transmitter sends confidential messages to a
destination via a source-destination channel (the main channel) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper
which listens to the transmission through a source-eavesdropper channel (the eavesdropper channel). Both
the main channel and the eavesdropper channel experience M -block fading, in which the channel gain
is constant within a block while varying independently from block to block [19], [20]. We assume that
each block is associated with a time slot of duration T and bandwidth W ; that is, the transmitter can
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Fig. 1. System model: hybrid ARQ protocols for the block-fading channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper
send N = ⌊2WT ⌋ real symbols in each slot. Additionally, we assume that the number of channel uses
within each slot (i.e., N ) is large enough to allow for invoking random coding arguments.1
At the transmitter, a confidential message w ∈ W is encoded into a codeword xMN , which is then
divided into M blocks [xN1 , xN2 , . . . , xNM ], each of length N . The codeword xMN occupies M slots; that
is, for i = 1, . . . ,M , the i-th block xNi is sent in slot i and received by the legitimate receiver through the
channel gain hi and by the eavesdropper through the channel gain gi. A discrete time baseband-equivalent
block-fading wire-tap channel model can be expressed as follows:
y(t) =
√
hix(t) + v(t)
and z(t) = √gix(t) + u(t) for t = 1, . . . ,MN, i = ⌈t/N⌉ , (1)
where x(t) denotes the input signal, y(t) and z(t) denote the output signals at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t (t = 1, . . . ,MN ), {v(t)} and {u(t)} are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) N (0, 1) random variable sequences, and hi and gi, for i = 1, . . . ,M , denote
the normalized (real) channel gains of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that the signal x(t) has constant average energy per symbol
E[|x(t)|2] ≤ P¯ . (2)
1For example, in a 64 kb/s down-link reference data channel for universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) data-
transmission modes, each slot can contain up to N ≈ 10000 dimensions [21].
6Let h = [h1, . . . , hM ] and g = [g1, . . . , gM ] denote vectors whose elements are the main channel gains
and the eavesdropper channel gains, respectively. We refer to (h,g) as a channel pair and assume that
the legitimate receiver knows its channel h, while the eavesdropper knows its channel g.
B. Wyner Codes
In this subsection, we consider a single-block transmission, i.e., M = 1 and introduce Wyner codes
[9], which are the basis of our secure HARQ protocols.
Let C(R0, Rs, N) denote a Wyner code of size 2NR0 to convey a confidential message set W =
{1, 2, . . . , 2NRs}, where R0 ≥ Rs and N is the codeword length. The basic idea of Wyner codes is to
use a stochastic encoder to increase the secrecy level [9], [10]. Hence, there are two rate parameters
associated with the Wyner code: the main channel code rate R0 and the secrecy information rate Rs.2
The Wyner code C(R0, Rs, N) is constructed based on random binning [9] as follows. We generate
2NR0 codewords xN (w, v), where w = 1, 2, . . . , 2NRs , and v = 1, 2, . . . , 2N(R0−Rs), by choosing the
N2NR0 symbols xi(w, v) independently at random according to the input distribution p(x). A Wyner
code ensemble C(R0, Rs, N) is the set of all possible Wyner codes of length N , each corresponding to
a specific generation and a specific labeling.
The stochastic encoder of C(R0, Rs, N) is described by a matrix of conditional probabilities so that,
given w ∈ W , we randomly and uniformly select v from {1, 2, . . . , 2N(R0−Rs)} and transmit xN =
xN (w, v). We assume that the legitimate receiver employs a typical-set decoder. Given yN , the legitimate
receiver tries to find a pair (w˜, v˜) so that xN (w˜, v˜) and yN are jointly typical [22], i.e.,
{xN (w˜, v˜), yN} ∈ TNǫ (PXY ).
If there is no such jointly typical pair, then the decoder claims failure.
Assume that signals yN and zN are received at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, via a channel pair (h, g). The average error probability is defined as
Pe(h) =
∑
w∈W
Pr
{
φ
(
Y N (w)
) 6= w|h,w sent}Pr(w), (3)
where φ
(
Y N (w)
)
is the output of the decoder at the legitimate receiver and Pr(w) is the prior probability
that message w ∈ W is sent.
2We call R0 −Rs the secrecy gap as the rate sacrificed to ensure the secrecy requirement.
7The secrecy level, i.e., the degree to which the eavesdropper is confused, is measured by the equivo-
cation rate at the eavesdropper. Perfect secrecy is achieved if for all ǫ > 0 the equivocation rate satisfies
1
N
H(W |g, ZN ) ≥ 1
N
H(W )− ǫ. (4)
For conciseness, we say that a code C of length N is good for a wire-tap channel with the channel pair
(h, g) if Pe(h) ≤ ǫ and the perfect secrecy requirement (4) can be achieved, for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently
large N .
C. Secure HARQ Protocols
We first consider a general (in M ) secure HARQ protocol for a block-fading wire-tap channel. The
transmitter encodes the confidential information (and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) bits) by using a
mother code of length MN . The obtained codeword xMN is partitioned into M blocks represented as
[xN1 , x
N
2 , . . . , x
N
M ]. At the first transmission, the transmitter sends the block xN1 under the channel gain pair
(h1, g1). Decoding of this code is performed at the intended receiver, while the secrecy level is measured
at the eavesdropper. If no error is detected, the receiver sends back an acknowledgement (ACK) to stop
the transmission; otherwise a negative acknowledgement (NACK) is sent to request retransmission, and
the transmitter sends the block xN2 under the channel gain pair (h2, g2). Now, decoding and equivocation
calculation are attempted at the receiver and eavesdropper by combining the previous block xN1 with the
new block xN2 . The procedure is repeated after each subsequent retransmission until all M blocks of
the mother code are transmitted or an HARQ session completes due to the successful decoding at the
intended receiver.
Now, we focus on the error performance and secrecy level after m transmissions, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Let
x(m) = [xN1 , . . . , x
N
m], y(m) = [y
N
1 , . . . , y
N
m ], and z(m) = [zN1 , . . . , zNm ]
denote the input, the output at the intended receiver, and the output at the eavesdropper after m transmis-
sions, respectively. For a given channel pair (h,g), the average error probability after the m transmissions
is defined as
Pe(m|h) =
∑
w∈W
Pr
{
φ
(
Ym(w)
) 6= w|w sent,h}Pr(w), (5)
where φ
(
Ym(w)
)
denotes the output of the decoder at the legitimate receiver after m transmissions.
The secrecy level after m transmissions is given by
1
mN
H(W |Zm,g).
8We say that perfect secrecy is achieved after m transmissions if, for all ǫ > 0, the equivocation rate
satisfies
1
mN
H(W |Zm,g) ≥ 1
mN
H(W )− ǫ. (6)
We note that this definition implies that the perfect secrecy can also be achieved after j transmissions,
for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Similar to the definition of good codes for a single-block transmission, we say that a code C of length
mN is good for the m-block transmission and a channel pair (h,g) if Pe(m|h) ≤ ǫ and the perfect
secrecy requirement (6) can be achieved, for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large N .
In particular, we consider the following two secure HARQ protocols based on different mother codes
and different combination techniques.
1) Incremental Redundancy: In the INR secure HARQ protocol, the mother code is a Wyner code of
length MN , i.e.,
C ∈ C(R0, Rs,MN).
In the first transmission, the transmitted coded symbols x(1) = [xN1 ] form a codeword of a punctured
Wyner code of length N ,
C1 ∈ C (MR0,MRs, N) .
Similarly, after m transmission, m = 1, . . . ,M , the (all) transmitted coded symbols x(m) = [xN1 , . . . , xNm]
form a codeword of a punctured Wyner code of length mN ,
Cm ∈ C
(
MR0
m
,
MRs
m
,mN
)
.
At the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, decoding and equivocation calculation are attempted,
respectively, based on the punctured code Cm.
We note that the punctured codes {CM , CM−1, . . . , C1} form a family of rate-compatible Wyner
codes with the secrecy rates {
Rs,
M
M − 1Rs, . . . , MRs
}
.
Hence, we refer to this protocol as the INR protocol based on rate-compatible Wyner codes.
2) Repetition Time Diversity: We also consider a simple time-diversity HARQ protocol based on the
repetition of a Wyner code. In this case, the mother code C is a concatenated code consisting of the
Wyner code C1 ∈ C (MR0,MRs, N) as the outer code and a simple repetition code of length M as the
inner code, i.e.,
C = [C1, C1, . . . , C1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
]. (7)
9After each transmission, decoding and equivocation calculation are performed at the receiver and the
eavesdropper, respectively, based on maximal-ratio packet combining.
III. SECURE CHANNEL SET AND OUTAGE EVENTS
In this section, we study the error performance and the secrecy level when a mother Wyner code is
transmitted over M parallel channels. Results given in this section form the basis for the performance
analysis of secure HARQ protocols.
For a given Wyner code, an important practical question is: under what channel conditions will the
communication be reliable and secure? In the following theorem, we describe a secure channel set and
demonstrate that there exists a Wyner code sequence good for all channel pairs in this set.
Theorem 1. Let P denote the union of all channel pairs (h,g) satisfying
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi) ≥ R0 (8)
and 1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) ≤ R0 −Rs, (9)
where I(X;Y |hi) and I(X;Z|gi) are single letter mutual information characterizations of the channel
(1). There exists a Wyner code C ∈ C(R0, Rs,MN) good for all channel pairs (h,g) ∈ P.
Proof: A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
In the system model described in Section II, the transmitter does not have any channel state information;
that is, one cannot choose the code based on a particular fading channel state. Hence, it is important to
show that there exists a Wyner code sequence good for all channel pairs in the secure channel set P.
To facilitate the formulation of outage-based throughput, we define that an outage event occurs when
the channel pair does not belong to the secure channel set, i.e., (h,g) /∈ P. Specifically, we distinguish
two types of outage: connection outage 3 and secrecy outage. In particular, we say that a connection
outage occurs if
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi) < R0, (10)
3The main channel is viewed as a communication link. The link is connected if a packet can be delivered to the intended receiver
successfully within the delay constraint (within M transmissions), otherwise it is in the connection outage. The connection outage
probability defined in this paper is also referred to as information outage probability in [19].
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while we say that a secrecy outage occurs if
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Y |gi) > R0 −Rs. (11)
Accordingly, we can evaluate both connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities, which are the
probabilities of each of the outage events averaged over all possible fading states. In fact, the connection
outage probability can be interpreted as the limiting error probability for large block length packets; the
secrecy outage probability can be regarded as an upper bound on the probability of unsecured packets.
Moreover, Theorem 1 implies that the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage probability
are not just average probabilities over a code ensemble, but they can be achieved by a deterministic code
sequence.
IV. SECURE HARQ WITH WYNER CODES
In this section, we evaluate the error performance and measure the secrecy level during secure HARQ
sessions.
A key part of an ARQ protocol is that decoding errors should be detected, so that ACKs or NACKs can
be generated accurately. A complete decoding function (e.g. maximum a posteriori probability decoding
or maximum-likelihood decoding) requires the encoder to add extra redundancy to the information bits,
which decreases the throughput slightly. The authors of [1] have shown that error detection can be
accomplished by using the built-in error detection capability of suboptimal decoders.
Lemma 1. [1, Lemma 3] For all ǫ > 0 and channel h, any code C of length MN satisfies
Pr (undetected error|h, C) < ǫ,
for all sufficiently large N .
Proof: The proof follows similarly to that given in [1].
A. Incremental Redundancy
To evaluate the performance of the INR protocol, we employ the following M -parallel channel model.
Let us focus on the decoding after m transmissions, i.e., the coded blocks x(m) = [xN1 , . . . , xNm] are
transmitted, m = 1, . . . ,M . As shown in Fig. 2, the block xNi experiences channel pair (hi, gi), i =
1, . . . ,m. We assume that each of the punctured blocks [xNm+1, . . . , xNM ] is sent to a dummy memoryless
component channel whose output is independent of the input.
11
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Fig. 2. M -parallel channel model for the INR protocol: the first m punctured blocks are actually transmitted (solid lines);
the remaining M −m punctured blocks are assumed to be sent via M −m dummy memoryless channels whose outputs are
independent of the inputs (dashed lines).
In this case, the mother codeword is transmitted over M parallel channels. At the legitimate receiver, the
decoder combines the real signal y(m) = [yN1 , . . . , yNm ] with M−m dummy signal blocks [bN1 , . . . , bNM−m]
to form
[yN1 , . . . , y
N
m , b
N
1 , . . . , b
N
M−m].
Similarly, the processed symbols at the eavesdropper are
[zN1 , . . . , z
N
m , d
N
1 , . . . , d
N
M−m],
where [dN1 , . . . , dNM−m] are M −m dummy signal blocks. We note that the added dummy blocks do not
affect either the decoding at the legitimated receiver or the equivocation calculation at the eavesdropper
12
since they are independent of the confidential message.
The codewords of the mother Wyner code C are transmitted in at most M transmissions during the
secure HARQ session. By using the equivalent parallel channel model, we can describe this secure HARQ
problem as communication over M parallel wire-tap channels and, hence, establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider the secure INR protocol based on rate compatible Wyner codes
{CM , CM−1, . . . , C1},
where
Cm ∈ C
(
MR0
m
,
MRs
m
,mN
)
, m = 1, . . . ,M.
Let P(m) denote the union of all channel pairs (h,g) satisfying
1
M
m∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi) ≥ R0, (12)
and 1
M
m∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) ≤ R0 −Rs. (13)
Then, there exists a family of rate compatible Wyner codes {CM , CM−1, . . . , C1} such that Cm is good
for all channel pairs (h,g) ∈ P(m), for i = 1, . . . ,M .
Proof: We provide a proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B.
B. Repetition Time Diversity
In the RTD secure HARQ protocol, both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper combine several
noisy observations of the same packet based on diversity techniques. The optimal receivers perform
maximal-ratio combining (MRC), which essentially transforms the vector channel pair (h,g) into a
scalar channel pair (hˆ(m), gˆ(m)). Hence, after m transmissions, the equivalent channel model can be
written as follows:
y(t) =
√
hˆ(m)x(t) + v(t) and z(t) =
√
gˆ(m)x(t) + u(t) (14)
for t = 1, . . . , N , where hˆ(m) =
∑m
i=1 hi and gˆ(m) =
∑m
i=1 gi.
Let L(m) denote the union of all channel pairs (h,g) satisfying
I(X;Y |hˆ(m)) ≥MR0, (15)
and I(X;Z|gˆ(m)) ≤M(R0 −Rs), (16)
13
where I(X;Y |hˆ(m)) and I(X;Z|gˆ(m)) are single letter mutual information characterizations of the
channel (14). For a given (finite) M , we have the following result for the RTD secure HARQ protocol.
Corollary 1. There exists a Wyner code C1 ∈ C (MR0,MRs, N) such that its m-repeating code
Cm = [C1, C1, . . . , C1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
]
is good for all channel pairs (h,g) ∈ L(m), for m = 1, . . . ,M .
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 by setting M = 1.
V. SECRECY THROUGHPUT OF HARQ PROTOCOLS
In this section, we study the achievable secrecy throughput for HARQ protocols. We focus on Rayleigh
independent block fading channels for illustration; other types of block fading channels can be studied
in a similar way.
We note that the optimal input distribution of the channel (1) is not known in general when the
transmitter has no CSI. For the sake of mathematical tractability, we consider Gaussian inputs. For INR,
the mutual information I [INR]XY (m) and I
[INR]
XZ (m) can be written as
I
[INR]
XY (m) =
1
2M
m∑
i=1
log2 (1 + λi)
and I [INR]XZ (m) =
1
2M
m∑
i=1
log2 (1 + νi) , (17)
where
λi = hiP¯ and νi = giP¯ , i = 1, . . . ,M, (18)
are the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, during
transmission i. For RTD, we can express the mutual information quantities I [RTD]XY (m) and I
[RTD]
XZ (m) as
I
[RTD]
XY (m) =
1
2M
log2
(
1 +
m∑
i=1
λi
)
and I [RTD]XZ (m) =
1
2M
log2
(
1 +
m∑
i=1
νi
)
. (19)
Although we consider only Gaussian signaling here, the results in Section IV can be applied to other
input distributions, for example, discrete signaling under modulation constraints.
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Let M denote the number of transmissions within a HARQ session. Given a distribution of the main
channel SNR λ, for both INR and RTD protocols, the probability mass function of M can be expressed
as
p[M = m] = Pr {IXY (m− 1) < R0 and IXY (m) ≥ R0}
= Pr {IXY (m− 1) < R0} − Pr {IXY (m) < R0} , m = 1, . . . ,M − 1,
and p[M = M ] = Pr {IXY (M − 1) < R0} , (20)
where IXY (m) and IXZ(m) are chosen either from (19) or from (17) corresponding to a specific HARQ
protocol. Let Pe denote the connection outage probability, and Ps denote the secrecy outage probability.
The definition in (20) implies that Pe and Ps can be written as follows:
Pe = Pr {IXY (M) < R0} , (21)
and Ps =
M∑
m=1
p[m]Pr {IXZ(m) > R0 −Rs} . (22)
Now, we study the secrecy throughput based on Pe and Ps. We first consider a target secrecy outage
probability ξs; that is, at least a fraction 1 − ξs of the confidential message bits sent by the transmitter
are kept completely secret. Under this constraint, the secrecy throughput η, measured in bits per second
per hertz, is defined to be the average number of bits decoded at the legitimate receiver,
η = lim
t→∞
a(t)
tN
, (23)
where again N is the number of symbols in each block and a(t) is the number of information bits
successfully decoded by the intended receiver up to time slot t (when a total of tN blocks are sent). The
event that the transmitter stops sending the current codeword is recognized to be a recurrent event [23].
A random reward R is associated with the occurrence of the recurrent event. In particular, R = MRs
bits/symbol if transmission stops because of successful decoding, and R = 0 bits/symbol if it stops
because successful decoding has not occurred after M transmissions. By applying the renewal-reward
theorem [1], [23], we obtain the secrecy throughput as
η(R0, Rs) =
E[R]
E[M] =
MRs
E[M] (1− Pe), (24)
where E[M] is the expected number of transmissions in order to complete a codeword transmission, i.e.,
E[M] =
M∑
m=1
mp[M = m]
= 1 +
M∑
m=1
Pr {IXY (m) < R0} . (25)
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We can properly choose the mother code parameters (R0 and Rs) to obtain the maximum throughput
while satisfying ξs-secrecy requirement. Hence, we consider the following problem
max
R0,Rs
η(R0, Rs) (26)
s.t. Ps ≤ ξs.
The optimization problem (26) imposes a probabilistic service requirement in terms of confidentiality;
that is, the service quality is acceptable as long as the probability of the secrecy outage is less than
ξs, a parameter indicating the outage tolerance of the application. Note that Ps is a decreasing function
of Rs, and η is linearly proportional to Rs. Hence, we can solve the optimization problem (26) in the
following two steps: first, for given M , R0, and ξs, we find the maximum value R∗s(R0); next, we obtain
the optimum R∗0, which maximizes the secrecy throughput η(R0, R∗s(R0)).
On the other hand, reliability is another important quality of service parameter. To achieve both the
connection outage target ξe and the secrecy outage target ξs, we consider the following problem
max
R0,Rs
η(R0, Rs) (27)
s.t. Ps ≤ ξs, Pe ≤ ξe.
In addition to the service requirement of confidentiality, problem (27) also imposes a probabilistic service
requirement on the connection outage, i.e., at least a fraction 1−ξs of HARQ sessions are successful. The
connection outage constraint ensures that, at the expense of possibly lower average throughput, the delay
constraint (that a packet can be delivered within M transmissions) is satisfied 1− ξs of the time, hence
enabling applications which trade average rate for decoding delay like voice communication systems,
e.g., CDMA2000 [24]. A similar constraint has been considered in [25] in terms of service outage for
parallel fading channels.
To evaluate p[m], Pe and Ps, we need the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of IXY (m) and
IXZ(m). For the RTD protocol, we can use the fact that
∑m
i=1 λi and
∑m
i=1 νi are gamma distributed to
express the CDFs of I [RTD]XY (m) and I
[RTD]
XZ (m) in terms of incomplete gamma functions. In the case of the
INR protocol, the distributions of I [INR]XY (m) and I
[INR]
XZ (m) cannot be written in a closed form. Hence, we
resort to Monte-Carlo simulation in order to obtain empirical CDFs. Note that Monte Carlo simulation is
needed only to estimate empirical CDFs, while (R∗0, R∗s) is found numerically by a (non-random) search.
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VI. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In general, the secrecy throughput of the INR protocol is difficult to calculate since there is no closed
form available for Pr{IXY (m) < R0}. In this section, we consider the asymptotic secrecy throughput,
which does have a closed form.
We are interested in asymptotic results as M increases without bound. Note that this asymptote
corresponds to a delay-unconstrained system. In this case, secure HARQ protocols yield zero packet
loss probability, i.e., the transmission of a codeword ends only when it is correctly decoded. As a result,
the problems (26) and (27) yield the same throughput, which can be obtained from (24) as follows:
η(R0, Rs) =
MRs
E[M] =
MRs
1 +
∑M
m=1 Pr {IXY (m) < R0}
. (28)
Let us consider how to choose a mother Wyner code for the INR protocol in order to meet reliability
and confidentiality constraints when M is large. Let λ and ν denote the instantaneous SNRs at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider an INR secure HARQ protocol with the mother Wyner code C ∈ C(R0, Rs,MN).
Then
lim
M→∞
P [INR]e = 0 and lim
M→∞
P [INR]s = 0, (29)
if and only if
R0 ≤ 1
2
E[log2(1 + λ)]
and R0 −Rs ≥ R0E[log2(1 + ν)]
E[log2(1 + λ)]
, (30)
where the expectations are over λ and/or ν. Furthermore, if (30) does not hold, then
either lim
M→∞
P [INR]e = 1 or lim
M→∞
P [INR]s = 1. (31)
Proof: A proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix C.
For comparison, we consider the situation in which the Wyner code C is transmitted over M -block
fading channel without using the HARQ protocol. We refer to this case as the M -fading-block (MFB)
coding scheme. Theorem 1 implies that, by using the MFB scheme, the requirement (29) can be achieved
if and only if
R0 ≤ 1
2
E[log2(1 + λ)]
and R0 −Rs ≥ 1
2
E[log2(1 + ν)]. (32)
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We note that the condition (30) for the INR protocol is weaker than the condition (32) for the MFB
scheme. In other words, the INR scheme can achieve the confidentiality and reliability requirements more
easily than can the MFB coding scheme by using the same Wyner code. This result illustrates the benefit
of the INR secure HARQ protocol.
Based on Lemma 2, we have the following asymptotic result concerning the achievable throughput for
secure HARQ protocols.
Theorem 3. We consider the secure HARQ protocols over a block-fading wire-tap channel. If the secrecy
information rate R0 satisfies
lim
M→∞
1
MRs
= 0, (33)
then the secrecy throughput of RTD and INR protocols can be written as follows:
lim
M→∞
max
R0,Rs
η(R0, Rs) =

 0 RTD(1/2)E [log2(1 + λ)− log2(1 + ν)] INR ,
where λ and ν are the instantaneous SNRs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Proof: We provide a proof in Appendix D.
We note that the RTD protocol involves suboptimal coding schemes, for which E[M] grows faster
than MRs in (28). Hence, the limiting secrecy throughput η is zero. Theorem 3 again asserts the benefit
of INR over RTD.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In our numerical examples, we consider Rayleigh block fading, i.e. the main channel instantaneous
SNR λ has the probability density function (PDF) f(λ) = (1/λ¯)e−λ/λ¯, and the eavesdropper channel
instantaneous SNR ν has the PDF f(ν) = (1/ν¯)e−ν/ν¯ , where λ¯ and ν¯ are the average SNRs of the main
and eavesdropper channels, respectively.
To illustrate how the secrecy throughput η is related to the choice of R0 (and Rs), we give a numerical
example of η versus R0 in Fig. 3, in which the parameter settings are as follows: the main channel average
SNR λ¯ is 15dB, the eavesdropper channel average SNR ν¯ is 5dB, the maximum number of transmissions
M is 8. (We observe that similar results are obtained by using other parameter settings.) For each R0, we
obtain the maximum R∗s(R0) that meets the secrecy constraint ξs = 1, 10−2 or 10−4, respectively. When
there is no secrecy constraint (ξs = 1), due to the sub-optimality of the RTD scheme, the RTD curve
is uniformly below the INR curve. This does not happen when there is a secrecy constraint. The reason
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Fig. 3. Secrecy throughput η versus the main channel code rate R0 under different secrecy requirements ξs, where the main
channel average SNR is 15dB, the eavesdropper channel average SNR is 5dB, and the maximum number of transmissions is
M = 8.
is that INR not only favors the information transmission to the intended receiver, but also benefits the
eavesdropping by the eavesdropper. Hence, INR needs to sacrifice a larger portion of the main channel
code rate than RTD in order to keep the eavesdropper ignorant of the confidential messages. This is
reflected in Fig. 3 that a larger R0 has to be chosen for INR (than RTD) in order to obtain a positive
secrecy throughput.
It is clear from Fig. 3 that there exists a unique R∗0 (and therefore R∗s(R∗0)) to maximize η for each
parameter setting. For all secrecy constraints (ξs = 1, 10−2 or 10−4), if the best R∗0 and R∗s(R∗0) are
chosen for each scheme accordingly, INR yields higher secrecy throughput than RTD does, which shows
the benefit of INR over RTD.
According to (21), the choice of R0 decides the reliability performance. This is shown in Fig. 4, where
we plot the connection outage probability Pe versus the value of R0. For both INR and RTD, Pe increases
with the value of R0. Note that a more strict secrecy constraint requires a larger R∗0 (as shown in Fig.
3), which however causes the degradation of the reliability performance. We can see that there exists a
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Fig. 4. Connection outage probability Pe versus the main channel code rate R0, where the main channel average SNR is 15dB,
the eavesdropper channel average SNR is 5dB, and M = 8.
tradeoff between secrecy and reliability.
Given a strict connection outage constraint Pe < ξe, the choice of R∗0 (and R∗s(R∗0)) might not be
feasible. For instance, in order to obtain Pe < 10−3, we need to choose R[RTD]0 ≤ 0.38 and R[INR]0 ≤ 1.25
(marked with ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). Specifically, for a connection outage constraint
Pe < 10
−3
, R∗0 is not feasible for INR when ξs = 10−2, and R∗0 is not feasible for both INR and RTD
when ξs = 10−4 in Fig. 3. Note that for the case of ξs = 10−4 (and ξe = 10−3), positive secrecy
throughput cannot be obtained for INR, but can be obtained for RTD. This implies that RTD might
outperform INR, when we have strict secrecy and connection outage constraints. This is a surprising
result in the view of the well-known HARQ performance when there is no secrecy constraint, where INR
always outperforms RTD [1].
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we show the secrecy throughput η under different target secrecy outage probabilities
ξs. There is no connection outage requirement in Fig. 5. There is an additional connection outage
requirement of pe ≤ ξe = 10−3 in Fig. 6. The parameter settings are λ¯ = 15dB, ν¯ = 5dB and M = 8.
We can see that small secrecy outage probability can be achieved when the throughput is small for
both protocols. The INR protocol outperforms the RTD protocol uniformly when there is no connection
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Fig. 5. Throughput η versus target secrecy outage probability ξs, when the main channel average SNR is 15dB, the eavesdropper
channel average SNR is 5dB, and M = 8.
outage requirement. However, when there is a strict connection outage requirement, the RTD protocol
outperforms the INR protocol when ξs is small (e.g., ξs ≤ 10−4).
Fig. 7 illustrates the relationship between the secrecy throughput η and the main channel average SNR
λ¯ when there is a target secrecy outage probability ξs = 10−3 and no connection outage requirement. The
average SNR of the eavesdropper channel is fixed to be 5dB. We find that the INR protocol outperforms
the RTD protocol significantly, especially when the main channel SNR is large.
In Fig. 8, we show the secrecy throughput η versus the maximum number of transmissions M .
Comparing with the secrecy throughput without the connection outage constraint, the secrecy throughput
with a connection outage constraint (Pe ≤ 10−3) suffers some loss when M is small due to insufficient
diversity. Both secrecy throughputs converge when sufficient diversity can be obtained as M increases. In
particular, when M →∞, both throughputs are the same and are given by (28) in the asymptotic analysis.
For INR, the secrecy throughput η[INR] increases monotonically with M . For RTD, η[RTD] decreases with
M due to its strongly suboptimal coding scheme. This concurs with the asymptotic analysis that, when
M →∞, a constant (nonzero) secrecy throughput (0.5∗E [log2(1 + λ)− log2(1 + ν)] = 1.31 according
to Theorem 3) can be achieved for INR, while zero throughput can be obtained for RTD.
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Fig. 6. Throughput η versus target secrecy outage probability ξs under connection outage probability ξe = 10−3, when the
main channel average SNR is 15dB, the eavesdropper channel average SNR is 5dB, and M = 8.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have studied secure packet communication over frequency-flat block-fading Gaussian
channels, based on secure HARQ protocols with the joint consideration of channel coding, secrecy
coding and retransmission protocols. From an information theoretic point of view, we have considered
two secure HARQ protocols: a repetition time diversity scheme with maximal-ratio combining (RTD),
and an incremental redundancy scheme based on rate-compatible Wyner secrecy codes (INR). We have
proved the existence of good Wyner code sequences, which ensure that the legitimate receiver can decode
the message and the eavesdropper can be kept ignorant of it for an HARQ session under certain channel
realizations.
To facilitate the formulation of the outage-based throughput, we have defined two types of outage:
connection outage and secrecy outage. The outage probabilities, more specifically, the connection and
secrecy outage probabilities have been used to characterize the tradeoff between the reliability of the
legitimate communication link and the confidentiality with respect to the eavesdropper’s link. We have
evaluated the achievable throughput of RTD and INR protocols under probabilistic requirements (con-
straints) on secrecy outage and/or connection outage, and have illustrated the benefits of HARQ schemes
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Fig. 7. Throughput η versus main channel average SNR λ¯ under a target secrecy outage probability ξs = 10−3, when the
eavesdropper channel average SNR is 5dB and M = 8.
to information secrecy through some numerical results and an asymptotic analysis.
In general, INR can achieve a significantly larger throughput than RTD, which concurs with the results
not involving secrecy that mutual-information accumulation (INR) is a more effective approach than
SNR-accumulation (RTD). However, when one is forced to ensure small connection outage for the main
channel even when it is bad, one is forced to reduce the main channel code rate. The INR scheme,
having a larger coding gain (to both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper), needs to sacrifice a
larger portion of the main channel code rate (i.e., requires a larger secrecy gap) in order to satisfy the
secrecy requirement. Hence when the main channel code rate is bounded due to the connection outage
constraint, the achievable secrecy throughput of INR may be smaller than that of RTD.
We conclude this work by pointing out some future research directions.
First, as pointed out in [26], many practical encoders are separated from the modulator and therefore
the performance of HARQ protocols is impacted by modulation constraints. Although we have assumed
Gaussian signaling, it is possible and also meaningful to extend the analysis to take discrete signaling
into account.
In our analysis, we have assumed random coding and typical set decoding. Future work should consider
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when the main and eavesdropper channel average SNRs are 15dB and 5dB, respectively.
practical coding and decoding schemes for secure HARQ protocols. Existing work on the practical secrecy
code design includes coset coding [27], low-density parity check (LDPC) code design [28], and nested
codes [29]. The design of practical rate compatible secrecy codes for Gaussian channels remains a
challenging problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For convenience, let p , (h,g) and P∗ denote the set of channel pairs (h,g) so that
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi) = R0 + δ (34)
and 1
M
M∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) = R0 −Rs + δ, (35)
where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small. It is clear that P∗ ⊆ P when δ → 0.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we first consider the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. There exists a code C ∈ C(R0, Rs,MN) that is good for any channel pair p ∈ P∗.
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A. Proof of Lemma A.1
Proof: Following standard continuity arguments [22], we consider a quantization of the input and
output of the channel (1) and work on the resulting discrete channel. Given a channel pair p = (h,g),
on every fading block i ∈ [1,M ], the channel is time-invariant and memoryless. Let x denote the input,
and let y and z denote the outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. From
the weak law of large numbers, we have the following limits in probability:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 Pr(x) = −MH(X),
lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 Pr(y) = −
M∑
i=1
H(Y |hi),
lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 Pr(z) = −
M∑
i=1
H(Z|gi),
lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 Pr(x,y) = −
M∑
i=1
H(X,Y |hi),
and lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 Pr(x, z) = −
M∑
i=1
H(X,Z|gi),
where H(X) is the input entropy per letter; H(Y |hi) and H(Z|gi) are the output entropy per letter
at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, in block i = 1, . . . ,M ; and H(X,Y |hi)
and H(X,Z|gi) are the joint entropies per letter in block i. Define the typical set TNǫ as the set of all
sequences (x,y, z) for which the above sample means are within ǫ of their limits.
The random coding ensemble C = C(R0, Rs,MN) is constructed by generating 2NMR0 codewords
x(w, v), where w = 1, 2, . . . , 2NMRs and v = 1, 2, . . . , 2NM(R0−Rs), by choosing the (MN)2NMR0
symbols independently at random. Given w ∈ W = {1, 2, . . . , 2NMRs}, the encoder randomly and
uniformly selects a v from {1, 2, . . . , 2NM(R0−Rs)} and transmits x(w, v).
1) Error Analysis: Given a message w ∈ W , the legitimate receiver declares that x was transmitted, if
x is the only codeword that is jointly typical with y. An error is declared if either x is not jointly typical
with y, or there is another codeword x˜ jointly typical with y. Let us denote this type of error as E1. By
following the same steps in [22, Theorem 8.7.1], we obtain that EC∈C [Pr(E1|p, C)], the probability of
error E1 averaged over the code ensemble C is
EC∈C [Pr(E1|p, C)] ≤ E

Pr [(x,y) /∈ TNǫ (PXY )]+∑
x˜ 6=x
Pr
[
(x˜,y) ∈ TNǫ (PXY )
]
≤ ǫ+ (2NMR0 − 1)E{Pr [(x˜,y) ∈ TNǫ (PXY )]}
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= ǫ+ (2NMR0 − 1)2−N[
P
M
i=1
I(X;Y |hi)−ǫ]
≤ ǫ+ 2−N(δ−ǫ).
By choosing δ > ǫ, we have
EC∈C[Pr(E1|p, C] ≤ ǫ1, (36)
for every channel pair p ∈ P∗ as the codeword length N is sufficiently large, where ǫ1 = ǫ+ 2−N(δ−ǫ).
Let B(w) denote the set of codewords corresponding to message w ∈ W (bin w). Suppose that the
eavesdropper gets to know w a priori, based on which it tries to determine which codeword was sent.
The eavesdropper declares that x was sent, if x is the only codeword in B(w) that is jointly typical with
z. An error is declared if either x is not jointly typical with z, or there is another codeword x˜ in B(w)
jointly typical with z. Denoting this type of error as E2, we obtain that EC∈C [Pr(E2|p, C)], the average
probability of error averaged over the code ensemble C is
EC∈C [Pr(E2|p, C)] ≤ E

Pr [(x, z) /∈ TNǫ (PXY )]+∑
x˜ 6=x
Pr
[
(x˜, z) ∈ TNǫ (PXZ), x˜ ∈ B(w)
]
≤ ǫ+ (2NMR0 − 1)E{Pr [(x˜, z) ∈ TNǫ (PXZ)]Pr [x˜ ∈ B(w)]}
≤ ǫ+ 2NM(R0−Rs)2−N[
P
M
i=1
I(X;Z|gi)−ǫ]
≤ ǫ+ 2−N(δ−ǫ).
By choosing δ > ǫ, we have
EC∈C [Pr(E2|p, C] ≤ ǫ2 (37)
for every channel pair p ∈ P∗ when the codeword length N is sufficiently large, where ǫ2 = ǫ+2−N(δ−ǫ).
Now we define an error event E , which occurs whenever E1 or E2 occurs, i.e.
E , E1 ∪ E2. (38)
According to (36) and (37), by using the union bound, we have for any p ∈ P∗,
EC∈C [Pr(E|p, C)] ≤ EC∈C[Pr(E1|p, C)] + EC∈C [Pr(E2|p, C)]
≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 = ǫ3.
It is clear that the average error probability, averaged over the channel set P∗ is
Ep∈P∗ [EC∈C [Pr(E|p, C)]] ≤ ǫ3.
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Interchanging expectations with respect to p ∈ P∗ and with respect to C ∈ C (since the integrand is
nonnegative and bounded by 1) yields
EC∈C [Ep∈P∗ [Pr(E|p, C)]] ≤ ǫ3.
Then, there exists a sequence of codes C∗ ∈ C (for increasing N ) such that
Ep∈P∗ [Pr(E|p, C∗)] ≤ ǫ3,
where Pr(E|p, C∗) is a random variable that is a function of the channel pair p. According to the Markov
inequality, we have
Pr (Pr(E|p, C∗) ≥ √ǫ3) ≤ Ep∈P∗ [Pr(E|p, C
∗)]√
ǫ3
≤ ǫ3√
ǫ3
=
√
ǫ3.
By letting √ǫ3 = ǫ4 (ǫ4 is still arbitrarily small), we obtain that, for any p ∈ P∗,
Pr (Pr(E|p, C∗) ≥ ǫ4) ≤ ǫ4
or Pr (Pr(E|p, C∗) < ǫ4) ≥ 1− ǫ4. (39)
Since Pr(E1|p, C∗) and Pr(E2|p, C∗) are both upper bounded by Pr(E|p, C∗), we have that
Pr (Pr(E1|p, C∗) < ǫ4) ≥ 1− ǫ4 (40)
and Pr (Pr(E2|p, C∗) < ǫ4) ≥ 1− ǫ4. (41)
According to (40), there exists a (non-random) sequence of codes C∗ ∈ C(R0, Rs,MN), which when
used, the legitimate receiver can decode the message with arbitrarily small error probability for all p ∈ P∗
with probability 1. Inequality (41) will be used in the equivocation calculation as followed.
2) Equivocation Calculation: Now we calculate the equivocation rate to check whether the perfect
secrecy requirement can be satisfied when codebook C∗ is used.
We bound the equivocation at the eavesdropper as follows:
H(W |Z,h,g) = H(W,Z|h,g) −H(Z|h,g)
= H(W,Z,X|h,g) −H(Z|h,g) −H(X|W,Z,h,g)
= H(X|h,g) +H(W,Z|X,h,g) −H(Z|h,g) −H(X|W,Z,h,g)
≥ H(X|h,g) − I(X;Z|h,g) −H(X|W,Z,h,g).
For the first term, we notice that
H(X|h,g) = NMR0. (42)
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To bound the second term, we define
µ(X,Z|h,g) =

 1 if (X,Z) /∈ T
N
ǫ (PXZ)
0 otherwise.
Now
I(X;Z|h,g) ≤ I(X, µ;Z|h,g)
= I(X;Z|h,g, µ) + I(µ;Z|h,g)
=
1∑
j=0
Pr(µ = j)I(X;Z|h,g, µ = j) + I(µ;Z|h,g). (43)
Note that I(µ;Z|h,g) ≤ h(µ) ≤ 1,
Pr(µ = 1)I(X;Z|h,g, µ = 1) ≤ NPr [(X,Z) /∈ TNǫ (PXZ)|h,g] log2 |Z|
≤ Nǫ log2 |Z|,
and
Pr(µ = 0)I(X;Z|h,g, µ = 0) ≤ I(X;Z|h,g, µ = 0)
= H(X|h,g, µ = 0) +H(Z|h,g, µ = 0)−H(X,Z|h,g, µ = 0)
≤ N
[
MH(X) +
M∑
i=1
H(Z|gi)−
M∑
i=1
H(X,Z|gi) + 3ǫ
]
= N
[
M∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) + 3ǫ
]
.
Therefore, we can bound the second term as
I(X;Z|h,g) ≤ N
[
M∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) + (log2 |Z|+ 3)ǫ
]
+ 1
= NM [R0 −Rs + δ − (log2 |Z|+ 3)ǫ− 1/N ]
= NM(R0 −Rs + δ1). (44)
To bound the third term, we need to use (41), according to which the eavesdropper can decode X with
arbitrarily small error probability, given that W is known in prior and Z is observed. Fano’s inequality
implies that
H(X|W,Z,h,g) ≤ 1 +NM(R0 −Rs)Pr(E2|p, C⋆) , NMδ2 (45)
for every channel pair p ∈ P∗.
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Now we can combine (42), (44) and (45) into the equivocation calculation:
H(W |Z,h,g) ≥ NMR0 −NM(R0 −Rs + δ1)−NMδ2
= NM(Rs − δ3). (46)
Note that the above equivocation calculation is obtained when (non-random) code C∗ is used, instead
of the random code ensemble C(R0, Rs,MN). Equation (46) implies that the perfect secrecy requirement
is met. This, together with the error probability analysis, implies that code C∗ is good for all channel
pairs p ∈ P∗ with probability 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Now we show that code C∗ is also good for any channel pair p ∈ P. Note that for every
p = (h,g) ∈ P, there always exists at least a channel pair p∗ = (h∗,g∗) ∈ P∗, such that h  h∗ and
g  g∗. With the input X, we denote the outputs from the channel (h,g) at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper by Y and Z, respectively. We also denote by Y1 and Z1 the outputs at the corresponding
receivers from (h∗,g∗). Since code C∗ is good for (h∗,g∗), Y1 can be decoded with arbitrarily small error
probability at the legitimate receiver and the equivocation at the eavesdropper with Z1 being observed
satisfies
H(W |Z1,g∗) ≥ H(W )−Nǫ (47)
for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large N . Since h  h∗, Y1 is a degraded version of Y, and thus if Y1
can be decoded at the legitimate receiver with arbitrarily small error probability, then so can Y. We also
have that
H(W |Z,g)−H(W |Z1,g∗)
= I(W ;Z1|g∗)− I(W ;Z|g) ≥ 0,
where we use the fact that Z is a degraded version of Z1, since g  g∗. Therefore,
H(W |Z,g) ≥ H(W |Z1,g∗) ≥ H(W )−Nǫ, (48)
for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large N , which is the perfect secrecy requirement.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We note that the punctured code Cm is obtained by taking the first m blocks, x(m) =
[xN1 , . . . , x
N
m], of the mother code C , where the block xNi is transmitted over a wire-tap channel with
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channel pairs (hi, gi), for i = 1, . . . ,m. Based on the equivalent M -parallel channel model, we can form
a new sequence of channel pairs by adding other M −m dummy memoryless channels whose outputs
are independent of the input. For example, we can let hi = 0 and gi = 0 for all i = m+ 1, . . . ,M . The
dummy channel pairs have zero mutual information between the input and output; that is,
M∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi) =
m∑
i=1
I(X;Y |hi)
and
M∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi) =
m∑
i=1
I(X;Z|gi).
Now, by using Theorem 1 and the fact P(m) ⊆ P, we have the desired result.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Applying the weak law of large numbers, we have the following lemma that is used in the proofs of
Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.
Lemma C.1. Let Ai be i.i.d. random variables with means µA and variances σ2A. Then, for alll ǫ > 0,
lim
M→∞
Pr
[
1
M
M∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < ǫ
]
= 1
and lim
M→∞
Pr
[
1
M
M∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < −ǫ
]
= 0. (49)
Now, we consider the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: Define Ai = (1/2) log2(1 + λi) and its mean µA = E[Ai], and Bi = (1/2) log2(1 + νi) and
its mean µB = E[Bi], for i = 1, . . . ,M . The connection outage probability P [INR]e , defined in (21), can
be rewritten as follows:
P [INR]e = Pr
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
Ai < R0
)
= Pr
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < R0 − µA
)
.
By using Lemma C.1, we have, for all ǫ > 0,
lim
M→∞
P [INR]e =

 0, R0 ≤ µA − ǫ1, R0 ≥ µA + ǫ. (50)
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We first prove the sufficiency given by (29) in Lemma 2 and show that if
R0 ≤ µA − ǫ and R0 −Rs ≥ R0
(
µB
µA − ǫ + ǫ
)
, (51)
then (29) holds.
Define
M1 =
⌊
MR0
µA − ǫ
⌋
. (52)
Note that (51) implies that M1 ≤M . Hence, we can bound the secrecy outage probability P [INR]s , defined
in (22), as follows:
P [INR]s =
M1∑
m=1
p[m]Pr
(
1
M
m∑
i=1
Bi ≥ R0 −Rs
)
+
M∑
m=M1+1
p[m]Pr
(
1
M
m∑
i=1
Bi ≥ R0 −Rs
)
≤
(
M1∑
m=1
p[m]
)
Pr
(
1
M
M1∑
i=1
Bi ≥ R0 −Rs
)
+
M∑
m=M1+1
p[m]
≤ Pr
[
M1∑
i=1
Bi ≥M(R0 −Rs)
]
+ Pr
(
M1∑
i=1
Ai < MR0
)
= Pr
[
M1∑
i=1
Bi − µB
M1
≥ M(R0 −Rs)
M1
− µB
]
+ Pr
(
M1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M1
<
MR0
M1
− µA
)
≤ Pr
[
M1∑
i=1
Bi − µB
M1
≥ ǫ(µA − ǫ)
]
+ Pr
(
M1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M1
<
MR0
M1
− µA
)
(53)
where the last step follows from the condition (51) and the definition of M1 in (52). Applying Lemma C.1,
we have
lim
M→∞
Pr
[
M1∑
i=1
Bi − µB
M1
≥ ǫ(µA − ǫ)
]
= 0 (54)
and
lim
M→∞
(
M1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M1
<
MR0
M1
− µA
)
= lim
M→∞
Pr
(
M1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M1
< −ǫ
)
= 0. (55)
Combining (50), (53), (54), and (55), we have (29).
Next, we prove the necessity given by (31) in Lemma 2. Based on (50) we need only to show that if
R0 −Rs ≤ R0
(
µB
µA
− ǫ
)
and R0 < µA + ǫ, (56)
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then limM→∞ P [INR]s = 1. Define
M2 =
⌈
M(R0 −Rs)
µB − ǫ2
⌉
(57)
where ǫ2 = (µA − ǫ)ǫ. Note that the condition (56) implies that M2 ≤ M . In this case, we obtain the
following lower bound on P [INR]s :
P [INR]s ≥
M∑
m=M2
p[m]Pr
[
m∑
i=1
Bi ≥M(R0 −Rs)
]
≥
(
M∑
m=M2
p[m]
)
Pr
[
M2∑
i=1
Bi ≥M(R0 −Rs)
]
= Pr
(
M2−1∑
i=1
Ai < MR0
)
Pr
[
M2∑
i=1
Bi ≥M(R0 −Rs)
]
= Pr
(
M2−1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M2 − 1 <
MR0
M2 − 1 − µA
)
Pr
[
M2∑
i=1
Bi − µB
M2
≥ M(R0 −Rs)
M2
− µB
]
. (58)
Based on the condition (56) and the definitions of M2 and ǫ2, we have
MR0
M2 − 1 − µA =
MR0
⌈M(R0 −Rs)/(µB − ǫ2)⌉ − 1 − µA
≥ R0
R0 −Rs (µB − ǫ2)− µA
≥ µAǫ
2
µB − ǫµA
> 0.
By applying Lemma C.1, we have
lim
M→∞
Pr
(
M2−1∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M2 − 1 <
MR0
M2 − 1 − µA
)
= 1. (59)
On the other hand, since
M(R0 −Rs)
M2
− µB ≤ −ǫ2 < 0,
Lemma C.1 implies that
lim
M→∞
Pr
(
1
M2
M2∑
i=1
(Bi − µB) ≥ R0 −Rs
M2
− µB
)
= 1. (60)
Finally, combining (50), (58), (59), and (60), we have the necessity of Lemma 2.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To derive Theorem 3, we need the following lemmas from [1].
Lemma D.1. Suppose A be a random variable with CDF FA. Then, for all a and a˜. we have
FA(a) ≤ FA(a˜) + 1(a ≥ a˜) (61)
where 1(·) denote the indicator function.
Lemma D.2. Suppose {Ai} is a sequence of i.i.d. zero mean random variables with variances σ2A. Then,
for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n,
Pr
(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Ai < −
√
nǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−n ǫ
2
2σ2A
)
. (62)
We note that Lemma D.2 follows from the central limit theorem and the bound on the Gaussian tail
function, Q(a) ≤ exp(−a2/2), where Q denotes the tail function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
A. INR Protocol
Proof: Again, we define Ai = (1/2) log2(1 + λi) with mean µA = E[Ai] and variance σ2A, Bi =
(1/2) log2(1 + νi) with mean µB = E[Bi], for i = 1, . . . ,M , and
M4 =
⌊
MR0
µA + ǫ
⌋
.
The reliability condition in (50) implies M4 ≤M .
We first consider an upper bound of η[INR] based on (28):
η[INR] ≤ MRs
[
M4∑
m=1
Pr
(
m∑
i=1
Ai < MR0
)]−1
≤ MRs
[
M4∑
m=1
Pr
(
M4∑
i=1
Ai < MR0
)]−1
=
MRs
M4
{
Pr
[
M4∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M4
<
MR0
M4
− µA
]}−1
.
Since MR0/M4 − µA ≥ ǫ > 0, according to Lemma C.1, we have
lim
M→∞
Pr
[
M4∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M4
<
MR0
M4
− µA
]
= 1. (63)
33
Hence,
lim
M→∞
η[INR] ≤ lim
M→∞
MRs
M4
=
Rs
R0
µA. (64)
Next, we consider a lower bound on η[INR]. Let M5 = ⌊MR0/(µA − ǫ)⌋. We have
1
η[INR]
≤ 1
MRs
+
1
MRs
M∑
m=1
[
Pr
(
m∑
i=1
Ai
m
< µA − ǫ
)
+ 1
(
MR0
m
≥ µA − ǫ
)]
(65)
=
1 + L(M)
MRs
+
M5
MRs
,
where (65) follows from Lemma D.1 and
L(M) =
M∑
m=1
Pr
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < −ǫ
)
. (66)
By Lemma D.2, there exists an integer n, finite and independent of R0, so that
L(M) =
n∑
m=1
Pr
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < −ǫ
)
+
M∑
m=n+1
Pr
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < −ǫ
)
≤
n∑
m=1
Pr
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Ai − µA) < −ǫ
)
+
∞∑
m=n+1
exp
(
−m ǫ
2
2σ2A
)
.
Since the first sum contains a finite number of terms (each being less than 1), and the second converges
for all ǫ > 0, we have that
lim
M→∞
1 + L(M)
MRs
= 0.
Hence, we have that
lim
M→∞
η[INR] ≥ lim
M→∞
MRs
M5
=
Rs
R0
µA. (67)
Combining (64) and (67), we obtain
lim
M→∞
η[INR] =
Rs
R0
µA =
Rs
2R0
E [log2(1 + λ)] . (68)
Furthermore, Lemma 2 implies that
Rs
R0
≤ 1− E[log2(1 + ν)]
E[log2(1 + λ)]
. (69)
Finally, combining (68) and (69), we have the desired result that
lim
M→∞
η[INR] =
1
2
E [log2(1 + λ)− log2(1 + ν)] .
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B. RTD Scheme
Proof: We first consider the connection outage probability P [RTD]e . Let Ai = λi with mean µA =
E[λi], for i = 1, . . . ,M . Based on (21) we have
P [RTD]e = Pr
[
1
2M
log2
(
1 +
M∑
i=1
Ai
)
< R0
]
= Pr
(
M∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M
<
22MR0 − 1
M
− µA
)
.
By using Lemma C.1, we have, for all ǫ > 0,
lim
M→∞
P [RTD]e =

 0,
1
M (2
2MR0 − 1) ≤ µA − ǫ
1, 1M (2
2MR0 − 1) ≥ µA + ǫ.
(70)
Hence, to ensure the connection outage requirement, R0 should satisfy
22MR0 − 1
M
< µA + ǫ. (71)
Now, we consider an upper bound on η[RTD]. Let
M3 =
⌊
22MR0 − 1
µA + ǫ
⌋
< M,
where the inequality follows from (71). By using (28), we have
η[RTD] ≤ MRs
[
1 +
M3∑
m=1
Pr
(
m∑
i=1
Ai < 2
2MR0 − 1
)]−1
≤ MRs
[
M3∑
m=1
Pr
(
M3∑
i=1
Ai < 2
2MR0 − 1
)]−1
≤ MR0
M3
[
Pr
(
M3∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M3
<
22MR0 − 1
M3
− µA
)]−1
.
Since (22MR0 − 1)/M3 − µA ≥ ǫ > 0 and Lemma C.1, we have that
lim
M→∞
Pr
(
M3∑
i=1
Ai − µA
M3
<
22MR0 − 1
M3
− µA
)
= 1.
Therefore,
lim
M→∞
η[RTD] ≤ lim
M→∞
MR0
M3
= lim
M→∞
MR0(µA + ǫ3)
22MR0 − 1 = 0.
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